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Militarising the Mind: Assessing the Weapons of the Ultimate Battlefield  
Robert Bruner & Filippa Lentzos 
 
 
Abstract: Advancements in behavioural neuroscience have revolutionised the treatment of 
mental illness by elucidating the mechanisms underpinning human behaviour and cognition. 
These advancements are not completely benevolent, but have dual-use potential which 
harkens back to a darker time when states sought to influence and control each other’s 
citizenry through psychological means. This article puts proposed behaviour-altering 
neuroscience weapons into their appropriate technical, historical and geopolitical contexts to 
present a sober and critical analysis of the threat arising from the weaponisation of 
behavioural neuroscience. It argues that by using psychiatric drugs, brain stimulation, brain 
imaging or neurobiochemical weapons, states may be able to leverage neuroscientific 
advances to influence, control and manipulate human behaviour and cognition. However, 
these approaches are extremely nascent and face technical and operational challenges that 
make their deployment difficult. Despite this, in consideration of the rapid pace of scientific 
advancement, growing geopolitical instability, and ambiguities in international law, 
scientists and the international community must remain vigilant as these technologies become 
more refined and the practical barriers to use begin to lower. 
 
Keywords: Behavioural neuroscience; pharmaceuticals; dual-use; neuroweapons; biological 





Behavioural neuroscience studies the biological mechanisms that govern the very 
aspects which make us human – our emotions, memories and cognitive processes – and how 
they can go awry and cause mental diseases. This subfield of neuroscience has been 
transformed in the last 30 years by a flurry of seminal experiments exposing how the brain 
works with greater clarity than ever before. While we are far from a complete scientific 
understanding of the brain and all its functions, scientists are starting to understand how 
biochemical and electrical signals transferred between neurons form closed circuits and give 
rise to the sensations of fear, anxiety, trust and even love (Yuste 2015). With this new 
knowledge of the subcellular reactions that contribute to human behaviour also comes the 
ability to exogenously control them. Scientists have harnessed this power to revolutionise the 
treatment of mental illness. Because of the new and refined understanding of the specific 
neural networks governing behaviour and cognition, psychiatric drugs and brain stimulation 
 2 
methods targeting atypical biochemical signalling associated with mental illness are 
becoming more specific and effective. Similarly, through the correlative power of brain 
imaging, researchers have been able to detect brain regions that are abnormally active 
following brain injury or disorders, enabling them to more precisely target that region. 
Troublingly, however, the alteration of brain chemistry by neuroscientists and 
physicians can not only treat mental illness, but also produce it. In addition to treating 
anxiety, depression or mania, psychiatric drugs targeting the same behavioural circuits can 
make a person experience these emotions. Moreover, brain stimulation at key points 
following an event show an emerging capability to enhance or delete memories, and brain 
imaging can provide insight into a person’s cognitive processes or beliefs, potentially 
providing a new form of intelligence: ‘NEURINT’ (Wurzman and Giordano 2014). 
Controlling behaviour, or altering memories and cognition, has obvious intelligence and 
military value. The allure of the militarisation of behavioural neuroscience can be attributed 
to its ability to enable the proliferation of novel weapons of influence that facilitate the 
changing of hearts, minds or political perceptions of actors by invoking behaviour-altering 
emotions.  
Propaganda, the selective release of information, and shows of military force have 
consistently been used throughout history to shift the perception of a conflict and, ultimately, 
the tides of war. The venerated masters of war and strategy – ranging from Sun Tzu to 
Clausewitz, and Napoleon to Patton – have all asserted that successful military campaigns 
must contain an element of coercion and psychological manipulation to degrade morale 
(Boyd 1987). The battle of Stalingrad, fire-bombing of Dresden, Vietnam War, and the 
Global War on Terror have all failed despite impressive demonstrations of military might 
(Szafranski 1997). Conversely, small, ill-equipped forces have overcome international 
Goliaths by understanding and manipulating the cultural and cognitive variables contributing 
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to the decision to fight or to surrender (Szafranski 1997). The ability of a nation to sway the 
opinions of adversarial individuals, decision makers, armies or whole societies about the 
costs and benefits of a conflict is the decisive factor which prevents a stronger force from 
succeeding or allows a weaker force to prevail.  
Influence is not limited to conflict, but is also used by numerous security services to 
massage information out of an obstinate person who possesses intelligence, or by police to 
illicit confessions from suspected criminals. Expert interrogators are trained to use subtle 
psychological manipulation and conditioning to create an environment where a person feels it 
is in their best interest to cooperate with investigators (Leo 1994). Interrogators employ a 
range of techniques to consciously manipulate the suspect’s emotion, attitude and even 
thought-processes to make the suspect feel powerless in attempts to facilitate the flow of 
information (Royal 1976).  
Despite the importance of influencing an enemy in war, traditional weapons of 
influence have so far been more art than science. A heightened emotional intelligence 
coupled with a refined understanding of the target’s culture, morals and values, are required 
to design effective influence operations and conduct interrogations which yield accurate 
information from an obstinate subject. Nontherapeutic application of behavioural 
neuroscience methods has potential to change this paradigm and allow weapons of influence 
to be wielded with unparalleled efficiency. Hijacking the biological basis of behaviour could 
potentially achieve the same effect as a traditional weapon of influence – the creation of 
emotions which cause a shift in the response to, or perception of, an issue – but in a 
standardised and predictable way.  
Assertions of the potential use of behavioural neuroscience would almost seem 
farcical if it were not for a long and dark history of government-sponsored attempts to attain 
the holy grail of influence: control of the mind. Most notoriously, the CIA’s MKULTRA 
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mind control programme – in operation from the early 1950s through the mid-70s – focused 
on the development of emotional manipulation methods to make a person more amenable to 
intelligence questioning, to brainwashing or to forcing action in the interests of the United 
States (Inouye 1977). Similarly, Soviet and Chinese security services engaged in practices 
that were focused on indoctrination, cognitive degradation and development of more salient 
torture methods (Moreno 2006:73-78). Scientists from all sides used barbaric techniques such 
as sensory deprivation, hypnosis, physical torture and mind-bending drugs in attempts to 
force others to cooperate with intelligence agencies, erase memories or create spies who 
could collect information on foreign adversaries or carry out assassinations (Marks 1979; 
Moreno 2006:61-82). 
The common thread throughout the American, Soviet and Chinese mind control 
programmes was the pursuit of scientific methods of exerting influence and coercion on 
others. These programmes were ultimately seen as failures because of a lack of scientific 
understanding of the precise physiological mechanisms underpinning the aspects of 
behaviour that each state was interested in manipulating. But, neuroscience now appears to be 
breaking down the previous technical barriers to control the mind at an unprecedented rate. 
The ability to selectively control neural circuitry and observe it in action seems to be bringing 
within arm’s reach the ability to exogenously control the mind and to subsequently influence, 
coerce and manipulate behaviour.  
The potentially serious strategic ramifications of the weaponisation of neuroscience 
has resulted in a proliferation of commentary on neuroscientific threats, needed ethical 
frameworks, and possible proliferation-control regimes (e.g. Dando 2015; Giordano 2014). 
Numerous high-profile reports have cited growing military applications of neuroscience 
(Royal Society 2012; National Research Council 2014, 2008). However, in these threat 
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analyses, there is a growing divide between claims of neuro-threats and empirical 
practicalities.  
A lack of technical, historical and geopolitical context has contributed to 
sensationalism and to the blurring of clear analysis. Is there actually a threat of states 
developing mind control capabilities using behavioural neuroscience? If so, can we expect to 
see it anytime soon? This article adds to the burgeoning critical literature analysing the 
security implications of developments in the life sciences by mapping state-of-the-art 
neuroscience research and bridging the widening gap between perceived threats and on-the-
ground realities. We assess four different neurotechnologies in turn: psychiatric drugs, brain 
stimulation, brain imaging or neurobiochemical weapons. We find it is technically possible to 
alter brain chemistry in order to introduce novel emotion, cause cognitive shifts and affect 
behaviour. However, endeavours to biochemically or electrically control the mind will likely 
be limited for similar reasons to previous attempts: neuroweapons are extremely difficult to 
operationalise in practise. Despite this, in consideration of growing geopolitical instability 
and ambiguities in international law, scientists and the international community must remain 
vigilant as these technologies become more refined and the practical barriers to use begin to 
lower.  
 
A critical approach 
Many of the works on national security implications of neuroscience consider the 
science to be fully formed, and ready for use. This is not the case. Even though 
neuroscientists have greatly improved our knowledge of the brain, there is still much to be 
desired.  
As Marks (2010) points out, the technocratic and discipline-specific language used by 
both scientists and defence officials prevents critical and clear-eyed engagement with the 
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national security implications of neuroscience and has contributed to growing dissonance 
between the assessed dual-use threat of the field and technical realities. Many of the claimed 
abilities thought to be rapidly approaching are over-hyped and divorced from the technical 
limitations and practical struggles that neuroscientists would have to overcome to even 
attempt to control someone else’s mind, implant memories or peer into someone’s cognitive 
processes (Caulfield, Rachul and Zarzeczny 2010). In reality, predicting the outcome of a 
drug, or using brain imaging to read someone’s mind, is still very difficult, and promising 
experiments are often limited to strictly controlled laboratory conditions and have not been 
tested in operational scenarios (Illes et al 2010). Choudhury, Nagel and Slaby (2009) argue 
that a critical approach can defuse unnecessary hype and enable the necessary informed and 
sober study of the security implications of neuroscience. 
‘Critical neuroscience’ analysis supplements a growing call for a critical approach to 
studies of national security implications of advances in biomedical research and the life 
sciences that contextualises developments within historical pursuits of the science, the socio-
political drivers of the research, and the technical limitations. Early pioneers were Ben 
Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel, who demonstrated, on the basis of their in-depth analysis of 
the historical US and Soviet biowarfare programmes, that there are important intangible 
barriers to the proliferation of biological weapons, and that ‘tacit knowledge’ has been 
marginalised in assessments of the dual-use threat of biotechnologies in the twenty-first 
century (Ben Ouagrham-Gormley and Vogel 2010; Ben Ouagrham-Gormley 2012; Vogel 
2013; Ben Ouagrham-Gormley 2014). Drilling down on one of the key emerging 
biotechnologies, Jefferson, Lentzos and Marris (2014) analysed the pervasiveness of naïve, 
simplistic and misleading assumptions about synthetic biology in policy discussions on its 
dual-use threat, categorising them into five ‘myths.’ Their work also drew out some of the 
subtleties that frequently disappear from policy discussions, demonstrating how “the 
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simplistic and discredited linear model of innovation that underscores the dominant 
understanding of the dual use threat posed by advances in the biosciences leads to an over-
estimation of the smoothness and ease of innovation for biological weapons development” 
(Marris, Jefferson and Lentzos 2014: 424). This is important, because exaggerated concerns 
about the misuse potential of synthetic biology in turn “direct the policy gaze towards 
measures that, on their own, have limited effects on security” (Marris, Jefferson and Lentzos 
2014: 423). 
This study draws on empirical and peer-reviewed neuroscience research, in 
conjunction with historical and geopolitical analysis, to discuss the potential for converting 
clinical uses of behavioural neuroscience to the battlefield. The article assesses these issues 
on two levels. We first examine the class of neuroweapons aimed at the individual, 
specifically considering the use of psychiatric drugs and brain stimulation. We then discuss 
neuroscientific influence weapons as they may be used against societies and armies. Here, we 
focus on brain imaging and neurobiochemical weapons. The particular neurotechnologies 
examined in the article are not inclusive of all neurotechnologies that can be used to influence 
human behaviour, or indeed of all weapons which leverage neuroscience towards militant 
ends. The specific cases were chosen because they are currently the most widely discussed in 
policy circles and in the emerging neurosecurity literature. The specific cases also most 
closely parallel previous state attempts at developing mind control capabilities. 
 
 
Psychological torture, brainwashing, and mind control 
The post-9/11 era has been marked by a perception that threats of terrorism are both 
urgent and unpredictable. With determination to prevent another domestic mass casualty 
event, US Armed Forces and the CIA employed so-called ‘enhanced interrogation 
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techniques’ (EITs) throughout the early 2000s to extract information from al-Qaeda affiliated 
enemy combatants at the Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay Detention facilities. Prisoners 
were subjected to open-handed slaps to the face and abdomen, forced standing in stressful 
positions for long periods, sleep deprivation, cramped confinement, prolonged nudity for 
weeks or months, and, most infamously, waterboarding (Central Intelligence Agency 
Inspector General 2004; International Committee of the Red Cross 2007). These EITs, 
however, were not born out of sadism, but were systemically designed with the intent of 
producing and controlling certain emotions – stress, anxiety, and confusion – that are thought 
to make a person more amenable to surrendering information (International Committee of the 
Red Cross 2007; Central Intelligence Agency 1985). The focus on prisoner psychology is not 
unique to US interrogation programmes. Across almost all instances of physical torture, there 
is a consistent goal: to control a prisoner’s mental state by manipulating their external 
perceptions and sensations with the hope of forcing him or her to cooperate and provide 
information.  
Indeed, several nations have engaged in sophisticated research aimed at the design of 
methods that could more quickly and efficiently control emotions and behaviour. Throughout 
the Cold War, the US, USSR, and China engaged in wide-ranging programmes aimed at 
providing each state with powers of irresistible influence over captive individuals. Mind-
bending drugs, violence and stress-inducing sensory stimulation and deprivation were used in 
attempts to manipulate the behavioural state and to remotely control the bodies and minds of 
prisoners. Ultimately, however, these efforts were seen to fail because of an incomplete 
understanding of the factors at play in the brain which required specific attenuation.  
Advances in behavioural neuroscience are now rapidly changing this situation. 
Psychiatric drugs which have been developed for therapeutic uses often result in side-effects 
which can affect mood and behaviour. Moreno (2006:171-72) and Thomsen (2014) propose 
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that when used non-therapeutically, these affective off-target effects can be used to 
exogenously produce many of the same emotions that are thought to be useful in 
interrogations. Similarly, brain stimulation methods show increasing promise –and risk of 
weaponisation (Fisher 2010). In line with mind control pursuits of the past, brain stimulation 
is emerging as a method that can be used to delete memories, control another’s body, or 
incept thoughts. Emphasis on worst case scenarios of the application of drugs and brain 
stimulation has resulted in an uninformed and inflammatory debate. In this section, we 
review the implications and practicalities of interrogation drugs and brain stimulation within 
its historical context. By evaluating US, USSR, and Chinese attempts at behavioural control, 
we argue that, despite promise, scientists and security officials still face the same challenges 
they encountered in the similar 20th century research programmes, and that these challenges 
will likely continue to inhibit their use in the future.  
 
Mind control: Ambitions and attempts  
The EITs developed by the CIA to extract information from Guantanamo prisoners 
drew on an understanding of prisoner psychology developed from US attempts throughout 
the 1950s, 60s, and 70s to exogenously modify behaviour in others (Moreno 2006:68-76). 
During this time, there were fears in both the US and USSR that the other side may be the 
first to militarise the mind and monopolise the ultimate battlefield. Most infamously, many of 
these programmes involved attempts to use paranormal phenomenon and psychic powers to 
control others. However, the primary focus was on determining and producing psychological 
states which made a person susceptible to new ideas, enabling the turning of agents or the 
degrading of a person’s ability to lie or resist questioning.  
The USSR was one of the heaviest investors in behavioural control research. 
Throughout Russian and Soviet history, deception, incepting thoughts and manipulating 
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perceptions were central fixtures used by the government to maintain influence and power. 
Today, controlling the mind – albeit through influence operations and active measures – are 
still widely used tools of Russian statecraft and domestic politics (Adamsky 2015). Thus, 
Soviet interest in standardised methods to control the mind is not surprising. While the 
Soviet’s mind-control programme remains opaque to Western historical analysis – in part due 
to language barriers, and in part because of the dearth of open information – a 1972 
declassified DIA report entitled Controlled Offensive Behavior – USSR describes how 
starting in 1932, Soviet security services falsely diagnosed political dissidents with mental 
illness so they could be legally sent to psychiatric hospitals, and ‘treated’ with high doses of 
psychiatric medicines in concert with a variety of methods such as flashing lights, sensory 
and sleep deprivation, the application of electronic and magnetic fields, hypnosis, and 
paranormal phenomenon in attempts to disorientate, confuse, and incite anxiety (LaMothe 
1972). The DIA assesses that in this state of artificially-created psychosis, guards were not 
only able to get intractable prisoners to cooperate in interrogations, but also to confess to 
almost any crime to discredit their own views and those of other dissenters (LaMothe 1972).  
We can never know whether the guards were truly successful in this brain washing 
exercise, or if, as the DIA claims, the prisoners, were ultimately broken and submitted to the 
will of their captors to end the torture. Regardless, these practices were taken up and 
modified by the Chinese during the Korean War in the early 1950s (Moreno 2006:66-68). By 
combining the manipulative Soviet interrogation practices utilizing extreme sensory 
stimulation and deprivation to create a fragile emotional state with their relatively advanced 
pedagogical techniques, the Chinese were able to coerce the majority of their US and UN 
force prisoners into confessing to their ‘capitalist crimes,’ disclosing intelligence to 
interrogators, and participating in tasks intended to indoctrinate the prisoners with Maoist 
ideology (Moreno 2006:66-68). A post-repatriation psychological examination and survey of 
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prisoners held by the Chinese army reveals that POWs were exposed to extreme hardships, 
the cyclical alleviation and reactivation of fear, and mind-bending drugs designed to create a 
sense of despair and helplessness in order to produce a malleable and desired psychological 
state (Schein 1956). It was explicitly communicated to the prisoners that these hardships 
would come to an end if they cooperated with their captives (Schein 1956). While interviews 
with POWs did not seem to show any immediate evidence that the Chinese were effective in 
their brainwashing attempts, there was concern by US Army psychologists that the effects 
could be delayed or remotely triggered, and that they were thereby undetectable in the near 
term (Schein 1956). US officials feared that these prisoners could be activated remotely via a 
cue and be turned into spies or assassins. 
What started as a defensive CIA programme focused on understanding and countering 
the psychological tactics of the Soviets and Chinese quickly evolved into wide-ranging and 
well-funded research into techniques to control human behaviour through unconventional 
means (Marks 1979). Not only did the CIA seek to extract information from difficult 
prisoners, but they also sought to psychologically manipulate Russian and Chinese 
immigrants into acting as foreign agents and doing the bidding of the United States (Moreno 
2006:67-76). MKULTRA1 – the name given to the CIA’s mind control programme –focused 
on the effects of alcohol and behavioural drugs in interrogations, unconventional 
communication via telepathy or psychic connection, hypnosis to force another to do 
something against his or her will, counter-torture and counter-brainwashing methods, the 
production of selective amnesia, and covert administration of mind-bending drugs such as 
heroin, marijuana, and most infamously, truth serums and LSD (Inouye 1977).  
While many of the more unconventional and bizarre projects enveloped under 
MKULTRA, such as remote viewing, psychic interrogation or hypnosis, were assessed to 
have low likelihood of operational success, the CIA saw the use of psychedelic drugs, such as 
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hallucinogenic mushrooms, marijuana, heroin, LSD and truth serums, to alter cognition and 
behaviour as a potential aid in interrogations or to selectively make someone forget a 
memory or an event. From this programme – and the Russian and Chinese programmes like it 
– the CIA learned a great deal about human behaviours –and how to manipulate them –which 
to this day is still drawn upon in collecting human intelligence.  
 
Coming down from a high: Why MKULTRA failed  
Despite new insights into the darker sides of human emotion, Project MKULTRA 
ultimately became regarded as a failure. The CIA ended the programme in the early 70s, 
assessing that behaviour-controlling drugs were not operationally useful in changing 
previously held views or in coercing potential intelligence sources into cooperation (Inouye 
1977; Marks 1979:144-62).  
 
New pharmaceuticals, however, appear to be changing this dynamic. To understand 
the threat arising from new drugs which can alter behaviour, it is helpful to evaluate the 
factors which led to the failure of MKULTRA. The effects of interrogation drugs – the 
central and most serious focus of the MKULTRA programme – were too unpredictable and 
variable. Moreover, the use of drugs in interrogations required high levels of operational 
security which resulted in the perception by intelligence officers that their use was too much 
trouble considering the little benefit they seemed to provide (Marks 1979:144-62). Practical 
considerations aside, the two most aggressively researched interrogation drugs: truth serums 
and LSD were evaluated as being more detrimental to the interrogation process than they 
were helpful. 
For example, ‘Truth’ drugs – most notably scopolamine, and the barbiturates such as 
sodium pentothal, and sodium amytal – are central nervous system depressants that do not 
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compel a person to tell the truth, but akin to a state of drunkenness, make a person less 
inhibited, more talkative, and less likely to lie (Lowry 2008/2007). Scopolamine was initially 
used as an anaesthetic during childbirth. It was quickly transferred to psychotherapists and 
subsequently, the intelligence community, after physicians noticed that women revealed 
aspects of their life that they otherwise would not have while on the drug (Lowry 2008/2007). 
After extensive testing, however, Scopolamine was disqualified as a truth drug by the CIA 
because several of its side effects – hallucinations, disturbed perception, drowsiness, 
headaches, blurred vision, and an extremely dry mouth to the point that it was impossible to 
speak – inhibited the disclosure of information (Bimmerle 1993).  
Barbiturates did not fare much better. Experimental administration of sodium amytal 
to 17 US Army soldiers with military charges pending against them resulted in suspects 
revealing fantasies, fears and delusions, as well as valid information to their interrogator 
(Gerson and Victoroff 1948). However, there was no way for an interrogator to distinguish 
fact from fiction (Bimmerle 1993). Nine of the 17 subjects confirmed that the information 
they gave under the influence of sodium amytal was truthful, while eight withdrew their 
confessions, leading the experimenters to conclude that sodium amytal may be able to reduce 
ambiguities in interrogations, but cannot eliminate them altogether (Bimmerle 1993). The 
drugs also made the subjects more suggestible and much more willing to say anything that he 
or she thought the interrogator wanted to hear (Bimmerle 1993). Most damning, additional 
studies demonstrated that it is possible for normal individuals without counter-interrogation 
training to lie while dosed with sodium amytal, limiting its usefulness for interrogation with 
foreign agents prepared with counter-interrogation strategies (Redlich, Ravitz and Dession 
1951). The truth serums made the job of an interrogator more difficult and quickly fell out of 
fashion. 
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Similarly, attempts to use LSD to make an interrogee vulnerable to questioning also 
yielded nothing but frustration and failure. LSD was thought to release memories, reveal the 
unconscious, and bring new levels of awareness to the intoxicated (Dyck 2005). The CIA 
became interested in LSD after discovering its ability to distort reality and perceptions, and to 
produce symptoms of schizophrenia and madness. The rationale was that the exogenously 
induced psychosis would make those dosed with the drug vulnerable to CIA intelligence 
officers (Marks 1979:39-55). While it was not seen as useful for extracting the truth due to its 
hallucinogenic and reality-bending effects, a declassified CIA assessment notes that an 
adversary may use it to induce anxiety or confusion, or as used by the Russians, to trick a 
subject into believing that they are experiencing psychosis and compel cooperation 
(Bimmerle 1993).  
Following repeated trials, LSD and similar drugs thought to control behaviour were 
quickly perceived as a hindrance, rather than aid to the collection of useable intelligence. 
These drugs often resulted in the inability of a respondent to string together complete 
thoughts, and indecipherable responses to questions (Bimmerle 1993). Interrogators needed 
to work harder to move questioning along in a linear fashion and constantly had to redirect 
the intoxicated subject. Interrogators also had to carefully ensure that their line of questioning 
did not introduce new ideas or cues to their now extremely susceptible, drugged subjects 
(Bimmerle 1993). Indeed, interrogators were required to demonstrate advanced skill to 
discern correct information from false information, and often had to use even more 
sophisticated psychological tricks to induce a drugged subject into cooperation (Bimmerle 
1993; Lowry 2008/2007). After the drug had run its course, the internal revelation that a 
prisoner had been drugged often resulted in variable effects in their willingness to continue to 
cooperate, or sometimes in the subject hardening themselves against the drug’s effects in 
subsequent dosing, necessitating covert administration (Redlich, Ravitz and Dession 1951). 
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Rather than stream-lining the interrogation process and allowing the extraction of information 
with greater ease, when using interrogation drugs, intelligence agents actually had to work 
harder to obtain accurate information, defeating the purpose of using the drug and giving 
them little – if any – practical utility.  
 
From truth serum to neuroscientific control? 
Despite the failures of MKULTRA, the promise of behavioural neuroscience has 
reintroduced interest in the use of drugs and other neuronal technologies to control and 
influence behaviour. Several have pointed out that the discovery of neuronal circuits 
associated with basic human emotions can lead to the creation of new biological and 
chemical weapons which target the central nervous system and influence and manipulate 
behaviour in a discriminatory fashion (Dando 2015; Thomsen 2014; Royal Society 2012). 
New pharmaceuticals can make a person more trusting, willing to talk, or akin to traditional 
methods of physical torture, induce fear, anxiety, stress, and confusion (Crockett and Fehr 
2013). Unlike past attempts at drug-induced mind control, the efficiency and specificity with 
which these new psychiatric drugs can affect the brain potentially make them much more 
operationally tempting.  
Outside manipulation of neural circuitry controlling behaviour is already a medical 
reality. Behaviour-controlling drugs are readily available, and in many cases, have been 
rigorously tested and approved for human use. For example, selective serotonin reuptake 
inhibitors (SSRIs), such as Prozac, Zoloft, and Citalopram act as a serotonin agonist by 
preventing its reabsorption following an action potential, and increasing serotonin-initiated 
neuron transmission. While commonly used to treat depression, increasing serotonin 
transmission via SSRIs has been positively correlated with prosocial behaviours and 
cooperation which may be useful in a questioning session (Crockett and Fehr 2013). 
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Moreover, numerous classes of widely available psychiatric drugs are known to induce the 
same behaviours which have traditionally been the goal of many torture programmes – 
without leaving any cuts or bruises. For example, Eurgeronics such as modafinil, the drug 
commonly prescribed for narcolepsy, are known to produce anxiety, nervousness, and 
confusion, and the Benzodiazepine class of drugs can generate depression, confusion and 
memory loss as side-effects to their therapeutic uses (Wurzman and Giordano 2014:98).  
Dietary modification also shows increasing promise for the exogenous manipulation 
of neurochemical signalling. Recent work in the effects of the microbiome – the bacterial 
flora located in the human gut traditionally thought to aid in digestion – on brain chemistry 
shows significant potential for covert alterations of neurotransmission. Researchers have 
found that psychiatric illnesses are commonly coupled with abnormal GI pathology, and that 
intestinal bacteria play a significant role in the development and response of the immune 
system, which may indirectly affect neurotransmitter concentration and shape behaviour 
(Vandvik et al 2004; Dantzer et al 2008; Sampson and Mazmanian 2015). By changing the 
diet of a person, or mouse, to alter the relative concentrations of gut microbiota, researchers 
have been able to produce anxiety and increase and intensify the hormonal stress response in 
both humans and mice (Messaoudi et al 2011; Bercik et al 2011; Selkrig et al 2014; Sudo et 
al 2004; Sampson and Mazmanian, 2015). Moreover, alteration of the macronutrients 
contained within food can also be used to affect the concentration of metabolic precursors to 
neurotransmitters and subsequently cause behavioural changes through the alteration of 
neural transmission (Crockett and Fehr 2013).  
This growing body of knowledge has interesting implications considering the past 
willingness of states to alter the food supplies of their enemies. In WWII, for example, the 
US attempted to lace Hitler’s food with female sex hormones to push him over the gender 
boundary (Marks 1979:12). Similarly, a defining characteristic of South Africa’s biological 
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weapons programme was the disguise of deadly microbes into food products for use in 
assassinations (Hay 2016). Interestingly, while being interned in Chinese prisons, Korean 
War POWs reported that the food they were given was one of the worst aspects of their 
treatment (Schein 1956). The psychiatric links to gut microbiota offer a possible explanation 
for this effect. By leveraging burgeoning knowledge of the connections between the brain 
and the gut, a state may be able to covertly control the neurochemistry underlying behaviour, 
limiting the sometimes-violent reactions that drugged subjects have and inhibit a prisoner’s 
ability to undertake counter-interrogation measures to interrogation drugs.  
 
Pharmaceutical modulation of behaviour is still hard 
Despite the increasing efficiency and specificity with which new psychiatric drugs 
can affect the brain, and the seeming ease with which neurochemistry can be altered, states 
seeking to use these capabilities in pursuit of behavioural control and manipulation still face 
technical and operational challenges. Several of the purported abilities that would be 
favourable to an interrogator of many of the widely-available drugs on the market are side-
effects of a primary action. These effects are not guaranteed and may be more prevalent in 
some people, and non-existent in others. The precise pharmacological mechanism of action 
for many drugs is still poorly understood and it is common for psychiatric medicines to have 
large variations in efficacy across populations due to anatomical and genetic variations, as 
well as individual family and medical history. Drug dosage also plays a significant role in 
determining the effects of a drug on behaviour. For example, by changing the dosage of 
SSRIs, researchers have found they can increase serotonin transmission at presynaptic 
receptors at low doses, and post-synaptically by high SSRI dosage (Selvaraj et al 2012). The 
increased transmission at different cellular locations can yield different effects.  
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Furthermore, neurotransmitter concentration in a specific location is naturally 
regulated based on the needed transmission or outcome at the time. However, outside 
manipulation of brain chemistry by psychiatric drugs increases the concentration of the 
neurotransmitter without discrimination and can initiate multiple or even opposing effects of 
receptor subtypes (Crockett and Fehr 2013). While it is feasible to synthesise a drug that is 
selective for one neuron receptor subtype, receptors are distributed throughout the body, 
further increasing the probability of undesirable side-effects. At present, it is not possible to 
un-invasively control neurotransmitter concentrations at a specific neuronal nucleus and 
produce desired effects, while eliminating others. Of course, this issue is not applicable to all 
classes of neurotransmitters and their receptor subtypes. Activation of multiple receptors 
throughout the brain may produce no, or even desirable effects depending upon the 
neurotransmitter being pharmaceutically manipulated.  
Medical and family history can also seriously affect both the short and long-term 
outcomes of behavioural control. Drug interaction with medications that a prisoner may 
already have taken may prove lethal. There is also increasing evidence that genes and even 
family members’ past experiences may change a person’s susceptibility to mental disease. 
For example, a study on the intergenerational transmission of memory in mice found that fear 
memories can be transmitted to progeny via epigenetic modifications and persist for up to 
three generations (Dias and Ressler 2014).  
There is no wonder drug, and just as the clinical treatment of a psychiatric disease 
requires a prolonged regimen of trial and error to find a medicine that both treats the 
symptoms of a disorder and has acceptable side-effects, depending on the desired effects of 
‘treatment’ a medicalised interrogation will have to similarly engage in an individualised trial 
and error process to find the appropriate drug or dietary modification regime to enable 
behavioural control, introducing significant complications to the interrogation process.  
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Even so, the bespoke process needed to implement drug-aided interrogations is a 
nuisance, rather than a barrier to entry. Throughout past torture programmes, methods were 
not standardised, but individually designed to maximise psychological impact for each 
prisoner. For instance, in the design and implementation of post-9/11 EITs, the CIA 
compelled behavioural scientists to find psychological weaknesses or phobias specific to each 
prisoner which could be exploited (Bloche and Marks 2005). Some prisoners were made to 
listen to unfamiliar and culturally distressing music, while others were made to observe the 
mishandling of the Quran – considered sacrilege by devout Muslims (Blakeley 2011). 
Ultimately, behavioural drugs can be used to the same ends as the CIA’s EITs: 
behavioural control. Just as the bespoke nature of EITs makes them time-intensive and not 
suitable for widespread use, the difficulties of using interrogation-aiding drugs makes them 
only suitable for the most intractable and high-value targets. The need for lengthy trial and 
error may soon disappear. Developments in genomic-based medicine are making it easier to 
predict patient response to drug treatment for psychiatric disease (Ozomaro, Wahlestedt and 
Nemeroff 2013). As genetic sequencing becomes faster and cheaper and the field of 
pharmacogenomics matures, doctors may be able to use a patient’s genetic profile to match a 
person to the appropriate drug. Similarly, it becomes more plausible that states seeking to use 
drugs in interrogations can obtain a blood or saliva sample from a prisoner to predict the 
effects of a drug on an individual.  
 
Using brain stimulation to alter memories and ideas 
Brain stimulation is also showing increasing promise for its ability to alter the 
electrical conduction patterns of neurons. There are numerous stimulation approaches – some 
of which, such as deep brain stimulation (DBS) have already been approved for the treatment 
of Parkinson’s disease and depression (Mayberg et al 2005). Of more interest are emerging 
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stimulation approaches such as transcranial magnetic stimulation (TMS) and transcranial 
direct current stimulation (tDCS) which noninvasively attenuate neural transmission (Sparing 
and Mottaghy 2008). Yet, the non-therapeutic uses of brain stimulation are becoming more 
evident (Levasseur-Moreau, Brunelin and Fecteau 2013). A growing body of research 
leveraging new techniques are starting to demonstrate a nascent ability to alter memories, 
control the body, and introduce ideas directly between brains.  
In 2013, Ramirez et al released a landmark paper where they used intracranial optical 
stimulation of hippocampal neurons to introduce a false memory of fear to a mouse (Ramirez 
et al 2013). While rudimentary in nature, this experiment demonstrates that memories can be 
manipulated by altering the firing patterns of key neurons. Building on this experiment, 
Deadwyler et al (2013) showed that memories can also be transferred between animals. By 
extracting and transmitting firing patterns observed while an animal was encoding memories 
to an untrained rat, recipients could successfully perform tasks where it had to utilise the 
memory that was transmitted to them (Deadwyler et al 2013). While these experiments used 
stimulation probes requiring surgical implantation, the emerging ability to incept memories is 
reminiscent of Chinese and Soviet attempts to brainwash and introduce new ideologies to 
prisoners. 
As Spiers and Bendor (2014) note, our memories ultimately define us and our global 
outlook. By altering memories, a state may be able to change individual alliances, long-held 
beliefs on morality or ideology, or even a person’s conception of their own identity. 
Manipulating the memories of rats, and people, however, is a rather large leap. How specific 
memories of information are encoded in the brain is still poorly understood. Extracting the 
correct information and tying it to an emotion which compels action – especially in violation 
of already-held beliefs such as loyalty to one’s country or the morality of murder – will prove 
to be even more challenging. The enhancement of memories by TMS and tDCS is more 
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plausible. Several groups have used TMS and tDCS to enhance short-term working memory 
and speed of recall (Gazzaley et al 2005). In this regard, there has been interest by states 
seeking to enhance the cognitive capabilities of their forces, but the offensive applications are 
minimal (National Research Council 2008).  
Brain stimulation also ostensibly provides new approaches to link brains together in 
brain-brain networks, which are showing a nascent ability to control the body and influence 
the mind. These networks have been created by scientists who use an electroencephalogram 
(EEG) to record the electrical activity of the brain of a ‘sender’ which is then transmitted via 
the internet to the ‘recipient.’ The recipient subsequently receives tDCS to decode and 
interpret the message recorded from the sender. Scientists have also shown it is possible to 
non-invasively transfer information between human brains. In a seminal brain network 
experiment, electrical activity correlating to motor movements associated with 
communication (e.g. mouth or tongue movements to form syllables and words) were 
recorded and transmitted directly into the brain of someone on the other side of the world (in 
this case, the sender was in India, recipient in France) (Grau et al 2014). The senders 
successfully transmitted words to the recipient without actually speaking. Using the same 
technology, a group at the University of Washington also demonstrated that a sender can 
share sensory information with a recipient to facilitate cooperation in video game play using 
a paradigm where only the sender could see the monitor and the recipient had the control 
(Rao et al 2014). The sender was able to communicate to the recipient when it needed to fire 
a missile at a fictional alien spaceship invading earth. 
The military applications of the brain-brain networks are evident. At a more benign 
level, a more refined inter-brain communication has potential to revolutionise command and 
control. But more malignant uses of this technology are easily conjured. Brain network 
researchers suggest that this system could ultimately result in one-way transmission of 
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emotions and feelings between individuals (Grau et al 2014). The unilateral flow of emotion 
or ideas will enable manipulation at never before seen levels. If a person unwittingly becomes 
a recipient in a brain-brain network, then planting thoughts theoretically becomes quite easy. 
At present, however, brain network researchers note that the low bit rate of data transfer 
between people limits the use of this as a communication system.  
Regardless of the burgeoning capabilities of brain stimulation, it is currently limited 
to the laboratory environment. The experiments described here involving humans are 
divorced from the real world by design and are not generalisable to operational environments 
(Fisher 2010). There are a multitude of factors – stimulation intensity, duration, location – 
which must be controlled to yield marginal changes in neural stimulation (Fisher 2010). 
Stimulation of deep brain regions still requires surgical placement of probes, further 
complicating military use. Moreover, the long-term effects and specificity of brain 
stimulation are currently unknown and further complicate its use (Sehm and Ragert 2013). 
Similar to pharmaceutical manipulation of brain chemistry, it is not easy, nor feasible to use 
brain stimulation to manipulate and control in a predictable fashion. 
Whether through psychiatric drugs or brain stimulation, altering the neuronal 
signalling of another is possible and can enable behavioural control, and increasingly can 
affect memory and cognition. Yet, this has been tried before, and previous attempts were 
abandoned for the same reasons that future ones likely will: mind control simply is not 
operationally practical. Drugs which can alter emotion or perception to aid in an interrogation 
are still too variable, and come with unwanted side effects. Moreover, brain stimulation to 
enhance and delete memories, or incept ideas, is far too nascent to be used outside the 
laboratory towards these ends. Military and intelligence conversion of these technologies is 





A wider net for influence and coercion? 
Thus far, we have discussed the ability to control and manipulate the behaviour of individuals 
in intelligence interviews and to create foreign agents which are forced to act against their 
will. Yet, the individual is not the only target of neuroweapons. Neuroscientific weapons of 
influence can also target groups of people. They can revolutionise psychological operations 
and propaganda to change perceptions and subsequent political desires of a population, or be 
used to create a new class of biochemical weapons which can degrade or enhance the morale 
or ability of a force to fight (Royal Society 2012). Here, we dissect the feasibility of using 
brain imaging and neurobiochemical weapons (NBCWs) on the battlefield. Akin to the 
previously discussed individually-focused neuroscience weapons, the technology is readily 
available. However, its practical utility is left in question. Group-focused neuroscience 
weapons present an interesting conundrum because unlike the neurotechnological 
applications focused solely at individuals, this class of influence weapons is seen as benign, 
or even preferable to conventional approaches, and thus their use may be seen sooner, rather 
than later.  
Brain imaging, for instance, is a non-invasive and low-risk method which can be used 
to pre-emptively test the psychological effects of an influence operation. While brain imaging 
presents interesting challenges to individual privacy, the militant application of this 
technology does not immediately cause the same repulsion as attempts to control another’s 
neural signalling. Similarly, NBCWs – weaponised psychiatric drugs and bacterium or 
parasites which attack the nervous system – are gaining popularity because of their reputation 





A new and improved PSYOP? The fMRI and neuro-intelligence  
Regardless of the context or desired strategic outcomes, wars are won and lost by the 
ability to coerce an opponent into thinking that resistance is not in his or her favour. Thus, the 
penetration of the collective psyche and the psychological operation (PSYOP) is an utmost 
consideration of many conflicts. US military doctrine defines a PSYOP as an operation with 
the explicit goal of reducing the morale and combat efficiency of enemy troops, creating 
dissonance within their ranks, promoting resistance within a civilian population against a 
hostile regime, and to convince both friends and foes alike to take actions which are in the 
interest of the US and its allies (Goldstein and Findley 1996). While a PSYOP is usually 
thought of as being limited to propaganda films, artwork or radio shows and the strategic 
release of (dis)information to sway public opinion, any military action – or terrorist attack – 
designed to ‘win hearts and minds’ or ‘shock and awe’ can be viewed through the lens of a 
PSYOP (Szafranski 1997).  
Despite their importance, PSYOPs are poorly understood and are widely disparaged 
in the West due to their inability to guarantee quantifiable and predictable results (Goldstein 
and Findley 1996). A bomb is lethal to those it is dropped on, but its wider psychological 
effects may be unknown or contradictory to the goal of a military campaign. Further, 
traditional PSYOPS are almost always conducted in complex environments which make it 
hard to conclude with certainty that a PSYOP has worked, or is responsible for military or 
diplomatic developments. Most significantly, effective PSYOPs which resonate with the 
target population are incredibly difficult to design (Goldstein and Findley 1996). They 
require a nuanced understanding of the target society’s culture, including collective values, 
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identity and decision-making processes (Goldstein and Findley 1996). However, if a state 
does not possess this understanding of its audience, it cannot hope to influence it.  
Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) may be able to provide solutions to 
these problems (Wurzman and Giordano 2014: 93-96). Recently, fMRI has enabled scientists 
to analyse how brains respond to different ideas and has given specific insight into a group’s 
collective identity and culture (Berns and Atran 2012). While not traditionally thought of as 
such, culture and biology are deeply intertwined (Berns and Atran 2012). Physiological 
responses to various scenarios are inseparably linked to our understanding of the world, how 
we make decisions, and the systems through which we distinguish friend from foe. When 
questioned about the existence of God, for instance, a religious person’s and atheist’s 
physiological responses demonstrate different levels of anxiety and distress – the religious 
person experiences decreased anxiety, while the atheist’s brain shows neurophysiological 
markers of distress (Inzlicht and Tullett 2010). While the cause of the activation is the same – 
there are no biological differences between the two groups that would cause them to respond 
differently to the concept of God – differences in cognitive decision-making and emotions 
arising from pre-existing values are responsible for the different activation of biological 
markers (Berns and Atran 2012). How a person perceives God changes their biological 
response to spiritual reflection. fMRI studies use this principle to attempt to obtain 
information about a group’s cognitive processes and culture.  
Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) uses a large magnet to alter the spin of protons 
contained within hydrogen nuclei and induce vibrations which then can be recorded to 
produce images of various internal physiological structures (Deichmann 2009; Logothetis 
2008). Functional imaging (fMRI) differs from standard MRI because rather than taking 
static images, the fMRI measures changes in blood flow to brain areas in real time, which is 
then used as a proxy to quantify regional activation (Deichmann 2009). Linkage of activation 
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in a single brain area is too one-dimensional to provide information on something as complex 
as emotion or cognition (Ariely and Berns 2010). Researchers, however, have discovered that 
there are reliable and consistent activation patterns across populations in response to varying 
events (Hasson et al 2004). Thus, the fMRI is a powerful tool because it allows scientists to 
establish baseline activation patterns for emotions or sophisticated cognitive processes and 
then use this aggregate data to correlate future fMRI images from different people to an 
emotion or cognition. The most alluring aspect of fMRI is that even if a person may not be 
able to articulate their feelings, thoughts or preferences on a subject, brain imaging offers 
correlative insight into these inner workings for researchers (Ariely and Berns 2010).  
Unlike the traditional anthropological and sociological studies of a population, fMRI 
seems to enable a measurable PSYOP that allows for guarantees of success and measurable 
outcomes. Theoretically, a state could use fMRI studies to measure the relative levels of fear, 
aggression, or even more complex processes such as patriotism or devotion in response to a 
piece of propaganda or a simulated military strike. Thus, states could use this information to 
predict and optimise the effects of both psychological and military operations without having 
to rely on the inherent biases and security problems associated with interviews and surveys. 
Similarly, fMRI appears to provide insight into cultural phenomenon by elucidating what a 
group values, or the way they process decisions (Pincus et al 2014). This yields otherwise 
unobtainable information and has led Giordano and Wurzman to assert that fMRI can provide 
access to a holy grail of cognitive processes, which when statistically aggregated, can yield 
an entirely new class of intelligence: ‘NEURINT’ (Wurzman and Giordano 2014: 93-96).2  
This claim is not completely without merit. While still at a developmental stage, 
DARPA’s ‘Narrative Networks’ programme uses fMRI alongside other neuroimaging 
platforms to understand how radicalisation narratives and propaganda affect neurocircuitry 
associated with decisions about morality and how listening to a story can evoke emotion 
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(Sanchez 2017; Venkatramanan 2011). Ultimately, DARPA seeks to develop a closed loop 
system where neural responses to a story dictate plot trajectory (Miranda et al 2015). fMRIs 
can be used to develop a baseline for how the brain responds to different narratives which can 
then augment PSYOPs and information campaigns to produce the desired result. For 
example, if seeking to design a PSYOP which inspires fear or trust, scientists can 
theoretically use the fMRI to measure differences in brain activation in areas correlated with 
fear to determine what types of propaganda are the scariest.  
fMRI has also been suggested as a tool for determining what lines should not be 
crossed by an actor seeking to influence a foreign and opaque culture. Experimenters reason 
that they can determine a person’s sacred values based on fMRI scans correlating with 
deontological or utilitarian evaluation when asked to violate or trade away their beliefs for 
monetary gain (Berns et al 2012). The neural responses recorded from this study can then be 
extrapolated more widely to the population to discern between sacred and non-sacred values. 
The authors of this study claim that, based on this and similar experiments, governments can 
use fMRI in counter-radicalisation programmes to parse apart the principal values which 
motivate terrorists to continue in their mission, or to determine the collective values of a 
society, which if violated would result in a backlash from the civilian population (Giordano 
2014; Astorino-Courtois et al 2017). To be certain, there is a technical – albeit 
methodologically limited – ability to collect NEURINT. However, examination of previous 
attempts by academics and marketers to use fMRI outside the laboratory demonstrate the 
difficulties a state may face if they attempt to establish a NEURINT capability.  
 
Practical limitations of ‘NEURINT:’ A case study on neuromarketing  
The designers of PSYOPs and marketers have much in common – they both seek to 
influence and change people’s behaviour through their messaging. Following numerous 
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experiments on the neural correlates of choice and economic decision making, neuroscientists 
and economists have come together to attempt to use fMRI to predict consumer behaviour 
and gave birth to neuromarketing (Morin 2011). Neuromarketers claim the ability to predict 
the popularity of a product by examining fMRIs of sample potential customers. For example, 
Berns and Moore (2012) found a post hoc correlation between neural activation in areas 
known to be related to future purchasing decisions and future album sales. These authors 
suggest that activation in the same areas to new songs will be predictive of future market 
success of the album (Berns and Moore 2012). Despite this, marketers have widely eschewed 
fMRI experiments in their product design and advertising life cycles for numerous reasons.  
While these types of studies provide pretty images, whether fMRI marketing studies 
actually provide better information than traditional modes of market research (e.g. focus 
groups and market tests) is unclear (Ariely and Berns 2010). Neuromarketing techniques 
utilising fMRI are only able to distinguish subject preferences relative to the different options 
subjects are presented with, which still necessitates independent design, and trial and error. 
Moreover, unlike traditional methods such as focus groups or surveys, fMRI studies cannot 
tell market researchers if all the options presented are bad. The fMRI would be able to tell 
neuromarketers which of the options is the least terrible, but researchers will not be able to 
know that none of the advertisements will be particularly effective. Within the context of 
PSYOP design, officials would be presented with the same challenge. Moreover, there are 
numerous confounding factors neuromarketers face which make it difficult to elucidate the 
driving force of a choice or preference towards a product with fMRI. Expectation of quality 
(e.g. cheap vs. expensive wine) or branding, for instance, both have demonstrable effects on 
fMRI outcomes, making it difficult to manipulate a single factor to optimise an advertisement 
(McClure et al 2004; Plassmann et al 2008).  
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Even if one generously assumes fMRIs can provide otherwise unobtainable 
information, basic methodological limitations prevent fMRI, and subsequently NEURINT, 
from being a meaningful tool worth military investment. To conduct these NEURINT 
operations as described by Wurzmen and Giordano, a state must have access to a 
representative sample of volunteers from their target population. This is not a foregone 
conclusion in a conflict. The populations that NEURINT is most useful for, such as 
combatant terrorists or impenetrable enemies, would also likely prove to be the most difficult 
to statistically sample with fMRI studies. Furthermore, participants must remain completely 
still while in the MRI, necessitating cooperative subjects. Any restraints or anaesthetics used 
to immobilise an unwilling individual will likely interfere with the validity of the resulting 
information. Additionally, the success of many PSYOPs are predicated on a degree of 
covertness (Goldstein and Findley 1996). Implementing the necessary operational security to 
gather NEURINT from a representative and statistically valid population will prove to be a 
significant challenge. While there may be a technical capability, the use of fMRI to enable 
PSYOPS and NUERINT has practical challenges which preclude its use.  
 
Biochemical weapons of willpower  
Ultimately, the goal of a psychological operation is to degrade the will or ability of an 
opposing force to fight or erode the morale of a civilian population. A more direct approach 
towards this end is widespread deployment of NBCWs, which utilise psychiatric drugs or 
pathogens targeting the central nervous system to alter emotion, cognition and perceptions of 
armies, or an adversary’s domestic population. Rather than trying to subtly influence or 
coerce a people through labour-intensive PSYOPs, states may seek to change the hearts and 
minds of a civil population, or rapidly degrade or incapacitate a militant one with a NBCW.  
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As discussed earlier, psychiatric drugs can attenuate the neural signalling 
underpinning emotion, cognition and behaviour. When used individually, they lend 
themselves towards producing emotions which may be helpful in an interrogation. The 
widespread use of the same pharmaceuticals on the battlefield, however, has also increasingly 
become seen as a threat to conventional forces. For example, a 2008 DIA-sponsored report 
describes fears of a small group using NBCWs to swiftly incapacitate or degrade the ability 
of a larger US force to fight without engaging in combat (National Research Council 2008: 
108). Additionally, at the 2016 meeting of the States Parties to the Chemical Weapons 
Convention (CWC), numerous states raised concerns that incapacitating agents which act on 
the central nervous system present significant challenges to the prohibition of chemical 
weapons. Under the CWC, chemicals which are used by law enforcement for riot control are 
not prohibited. This loophole could enable a state to legally develop advanced NBCWs under 
the guise of a riot control agent, and deploy them in a conflict.3  
The most threatening, and most likely to be used, NBCWs are hypnotic drugs which 
reduce alertness, sedate, and anaesthetise (Royal Society 2012:44). Psychedelic drugs, 
however, which alter cognition, emotion, and behaviour also have potential for battlefield 
deployment because of their ability to disorientate. Moreover, the pharmaceuticals previously 
discussed for use as an interrogation aid can also be mass produced and weaponised to incite 
debilitating fear and anxiety on the battlefield. Numerous microbes and toxins which target 
the nervous system also have potential to affect the decision-making process to fight or 
surrender.4 For example, the parasite Toxoplasma gondii can cause impulsivity, agitation and 
confusion, and the Gambierdiscus toxicus bacterium can cause nightmares and a burning 
sensation (Wurzman and Giordano 2014: 104).  
Weapons which target the nervous system are not new. Nerve agents (e.g. sarin, 
sabin, VX) work by manipulating acetylcholine transmission in key motor areas, 
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subsequently causing muscle spasms, paralysis, and death. What distinguishes the types of 
NBCWs of interest here – drugs and bugs that influence behaviour – from other biological 
and chemical weapons is they offer the ability to non-lethally incapacitate, rather than kill. 
History is rife with examples of attempted production of behaviour-influencing drugs. US-
sponsored LSD experimentation originally started as an Army project focused on developing 
a chemical weapon that could rapidly degrade the fighting ability of a force (Marks 1979: 39-
54). Moreover, a declassified US Air Force document reports that the US sought to develop a 
“gay bomb” which would have weaponised an aphrodisiac and was aimed at making enemy 
soldiers sexually irresistible to one another and deliver “a sharp blow” to combatant morale 
(Wright Laboratory). While the gay bomb never came to fruition due to a perceived lack of 
feasibility, there are currently several groups of behaviour-influencing drugs that can feasibly 
be scaled up and deployed in combat.  
Both pharmaceuticals and microbes can undermine morale and cause troops to break 
ranks or flee in combat. Similarly, drugs and bugs can be used to increase aggression, 
alertness or reactiveness in a state’s own forces (Royal Society 2012). These NBCWs have 
the ability to alter the perception of combatant troops, or, if spread over a population centre, 
to cause a swift change in the political support for a leader or to result in civil unrest (Royal 
Society 2012: 50). However, the same challenges that biological and chemical weapons have 
always faced – effective delivery and dissemination of the agent – are still relevant to 
neurologically-targeted NBCWs.  
 
New science, old problems  
In the fall of 2002, Russian Special Forces pumped a mixture of the opiates 
carfentanil and remifentanil into a theatre besieged by Chechen rebels in Moscow. The 
tactical use of these opioids was intended to sedate and enable the arrest of the captors 
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without the loss of life (Walsh 2002). However, the opioid mixture was not disseminated in a 
uniform manner, resulting in varying concentrations and dosages throughout the theatre and 
the death of not only all of the Chechen rebels, but also 129 of the hostages (Tracey and 
Flower 2014). This oft-cited operation underscores another technical challenge of deploying 
NBCWs on the battlefield: widespread and uniform dissemination. If a drug was relied on to 
incapacitate a large ground force, obtaining an even distribution and dosage affecting all 
equally to maintain the non-lethality associated with a NBCW will pose to be a significant 
challenge.  
While a NBCW may be disseminated through cutaneous absorption, aerosolisation 
and inhalation are the preferred methods to disseminate a NBCW due to the need for an agent 
to first enter the blood stream in order to cross the blood brain barrier (Royal Society 
2012:50).5 Aerosolisation has proven to pose a significant barrier to non-state actors seeking 
to use biological or chemical weapons. Aerosol droplets must be within a certain size to be 
able to penetrate respiratory tissue and enter the blood stream. If the droplet is too small, 
particles will simply be exhaled. If it is too large, the droplet will be trapped in the passages 
of the respiratory tract. A munition can deliver and correctly aerosolise a biological or 
chemical weapon, but degrades large proportions of the agent on impact, and thereby limits 
its utility (Kerr 2008). But if the advantage of a NBCW over the more traditional biological 
and chemical weapons is their ability to non-lethally alter mood and perceptions, the high 
mortality rate resulting from the explosion of the munition itself would inhibit desired non-
lethal outcomes as well.  
Industrial sprayers can also aerosolise and deliver a NBCW, but getting the sprayer in 
proximity to a target population can be challenging – especially for a non-state group. Yet, 
access to a sprayer does not necessarily indicate capability to disseminate a NBCW. The 
difficulty of obtaining a droplet in the ‘sweet spot’ has prevented many would-be bioterrorists 
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from completing successful attacks and will continue to do so. For example, a 1993 attempt 
by the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo cult to use anthrax in a terrorist attack failed because their 
dissemination method produced droplets that were too big to be carried by the wind, let alone 
be absorbed into the body (Takahashi et al). While this is less of a challenge for states with 
access to sophisticated technology or agents available as a gas, as the Moscow theatre 
incident demonstrates, it is difficult – if not impossible – to disseminate a NBCW in a manner 
which accounts for variations in the dosage needed to incapacitate – but not kill –large 
groups.  
It is hard to imagine a scenario where an actor could deploy these types of weapons 
broadly and ensure that all the intended targets receive a dose which is sufficient to influence 
behaviour, but not kill. What is a proper dose for one, can prove deadly to another. Similarly, 
considering the varying immunological profiles of individuals, a behaviour altering microbe 
could work perfectly in some, but be ineffectual in others (Tracey and Flower 2014). If even 
dissemination and distribution cannot be accomplished, then these weapons are no different 
from traditional biological and chemical weapons.  
At the surface fMRIs and NBCWs seem to present the ability to use behavioural 
neuroscience to control and manipulate societies and armies. However, after further 
inspection there are several technical and practical barriers limiting their use. fMRI may be 
theoretically useful in PSYOP design, but the added complexity introduced by its use coupled 
with the marginal – if any – benefits it can provide to security services makes it unlikely to be 
used. Similarly, while many NBCW agents that can influence behaviour are available, their 
weaponisation in a manner which retains their non-lethal characteristics significantly limit 




Scientific breakthroughs in the biological basis of behaviour and cognition have given 
rise to numerous treatments for neurological and psychiatric disorders that have improved the 
quality of life for many people all over the world. While current developments within 
neuroscience have sparked renewed interest in their potential for weaponization and other 
military and intelligence uses, the hype around these developments far exceeds current 
capacities. Make no mistake, psychiatric drugs, brain stimulation, brain imaging and NCBWs 
can be misused to alter emotions or memories, incept ideas, cause cognitive shifts, and affect 
behaviour. However, there are still significant technical challenges to doing so and 
operationalising neuroweapons remains extremely difficult.  
Yet, while it is unlikely that promises of mind control will be realised by 
neuroweapons any time soon, it would be naïve to assume that approaches to behavioural 
control will not become more refined over time, and that barriers to misuse will not lower as 
we continue to pursue better psychiatric treatment. This point is underscored by the rapid 
pace of scientific advancement in other fields that have more broadly contributed to a 
changing threat perception emanating from the life sciences. In the past five years, gene 
editing and synthetic biology have made significant strides and have raised new fears that 
highly lethal biological agents can be produced in the lab from scratch (DiEuliis et. al 2017; 
Koblentz 2017), or produce genetically modified pathogens which are more lethal, 
contagious, or resistant to existing medical countermeasures (Clapper, 2016). Moreover, 
DiEuliis and Giordano (2017) have noted that CRISPR/CAS-9 gene editing may be used as a 
path to novel neuroweapons that are far superior to current weaponisable pathogens acting on 
the central nervous system. As neuroscience progresses, the technologies discussed here can 
be weaponised and deployed by actors willing to expend the time, money and resources 
necessary to further develop them.  
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International humanitarian law6 and armament law7 form crucially important 
components in governing the development and use of neuroweapons. On the surface, these 
standards prohibit neuroweapons. Their strength, however, has been weakened by 
ambiguities and the defiance of state actors. For instance, the lack of guidance on specific 
actions which constitute torture by international bodies enabled the Bush administration to 
argue the EITs of the CIA did not meet the severity threshold of pain or mental injury 
required by international law and, thus, could not be considered torture under existing treaties 
(Mayerfeld 2007). In the context of state-attempts at behavioural control, the same argument 
can be used to explain away the use of pharmaceuticals or neurotechnology which 
malevolently alters the inner workings of the brain. The prohibition of NBCWs by armament 
law is much stronger, but here too there are loopholes and ambiguities. The exclusion of 
chemical weapons intended for riot control under the Chemical Weapons Convention, for 
instance, provides space for states to legally develop incapacitating weapons under the guise 
of a domestic riot control agent, and then rapidly convert NBCWs for use in conflict (Royal 
Society 2012: 21-24). 
Further challenging the governance framework, are suggestions that, as the 
technologies described here become more developed, there may be shifts in perceived utility 
– as we are witnessing more generally with respect to biological weapons (Lentzos 2017). 
For example, Keane (2010) suggests drugs that simulate a state of euphoria and positive 
emotions to make a person talk are not only permissible, but a morally superior substitute for 
torture and enhanced interrogation. Existing socio-political calculations about the utility of 
neuroscience-based influence weapons may change and drive further military and 
intelligence development. These shifting perceptions are coupled with increasing geopolitical 
turbulence and a shift away from state-centric conflict wherein behavioural control may 
become ever more tempting (Dando 2015:174-75).  
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If this prediction holds to be true, the changing perception of neuroscience-based 
influence weapons will place significant strain on humanitarian and armament law. In recent 
history, there have been several challenges to the taboos against inhumane treatment and to 
biochemical weapons, and these challenges are likely to continue. The continual use of 
chemical weapons in Syria, for instance, to indiscriminately target civilians with chlorine and 
sarin gas attacks – and the inability of the United Nations to prevent and punish their use – 
greatly endangers the international taboo associated with unconventional weapons, and risks 
broader legitimisation of chemical weapon attacks (Ilchmann and Revill 2014). Moreover, 
the Bush administration’s refusal to adhere to international principles on the use of EITs has 
resulted in a general degradation of norms against torture (McKeown 2009). Despite the 
prohibition by humanitarian law and the recommendations of senior interrogators, top 
decision leaders remain convinced that torture is efficacious and refuse to uphold human 
rights. President Trump appears to be an active proponent of coercive techniques. Both while 
campaigning and after sworn into office, President Trump described a belief in the efficacy of 
torture and even went as far as saying he would “bring back a hell of a lot worse than 
waterboarding,” (McCarthy 2016; Gordon 2017) and has advocated for excessive police 
brutality (Wootson and Berman 2017). Moreover, there have been reports of torture and 
human rights violations emanating from Crimea following its Russian annexation (Cumming-
Bruce 2017) and Chinese prisoners continue to be subjected to aggressive interrogation 
methods designed to degrade prisoners’ will power and incite cooperation (Washington Post 
Editorial Board 2017).  
As the world order continues to move away from one clear dominant power – 
America – to an increasingly multipolar world, where rising powers view human rights, 
justice, transparency and use of force differently, the challenges to humanitarian and 
armament law will only increase. To monitor the conversion of behavioural neuroscience 
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from benign medical treatments to malignant weapons, and to shape how neuroweapons may 
be perceived and used, it is of the utmost importance that the international community 
strengthens the existing normative and legal framework embodied in multilateral treaties and 
national laws and regulations. The medical standards, codes of practice and research ethics 
that doctors and scientists are obliged to uphold must also be strengthened with a view to the 
potential misuse of behavioural neuroscience. The containment of neuroweapons relies on the 
strength of norms from the top down and the bottom up against the use of torture, 
unconventional weapons and the militant use of neuroscience.  
The analysis presented here is largely predicated on a state’s desire for sophisticated 
weaponry and for predictability and assurances of efficacy, as well as its compulsion to 
comply with international norms and treaties. If these requirements are taken out of the 
equation, the barriers to entry of neuroweapons quickly decrease. For example, terrorist 
groups may seek psychiatric drugs as a direct route to torture, or, akin to previous Soviet 
interrogation attempts, simply to make a person publicly ‘confess’ to any sort of crimes. 
Furthermore, administration of psychiatric drugs requires expert knowledge, but due to the 
widespread use and availability of street drugs, their effects are well known and can be used 
without a basic understanding of the neuroscientific principles underpinning them. It would 
be relatively easy for an unsophisticated non-state group to obtain LSD or other mind-
bending drugs and covertly administer them to prisoners without facing the need for 
predictability and reliability that a state seeking to use drugs to illicit accurate information 
may face. The Islamic State (ISIS) has already used pharmaceuticals to dose their fighters 
with Captagen, an amphetamine which – based on reports of returning fighters – makes ISIS 
combatants resistant to pain and more courageous (Gidda 2017). Additionally, a state can just 
as easily turn these technologies inward and use them against their domestic population. 
While the technologies described here can and have been used as riot control agents or in 
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narcoanalysis, brain imaging also has interesting implications for use in crafting political 
messages focused at a sub-section of voters.  
That caveat aside, in sum: Is using neuroscience to influence, coerce, and manipulate 
a threat? Yes, it is. While still difficult, there is an emerging technical capability for 
behavioural neuroscience to be used to enable a new class of influence weapons. Yet, it is not 
a near-term threat and it is heavily dependent upon technological development which makes 
neuroscience cheaper and easier to use in a combat setting—as well as on more 
organisational, managerial, social political and economic factors (Ben Ouagrham-Gormley 
2014). It is also dependent on the willingness of an actor to defy international law and ethical 
standards. Both scientists and the international community must remain vigilant about 
behavioural neuroscience leaking into the security realm.  
1 MKULTRA is also known in the literature by previous code names ‘BLUEBIRD’ and ‘ARTICHOKE’ 
2 In addition to enabling the design of refined PSYOPs, these authors posit that the cultural information obtained 
by fMRI can provide richer context in the collection and analysis of HUMINT and SIGINT.  
3 At the time of writing, closing this loophole continues to be an explicit goal for certain CWC states parties. An 
agreement banning agents acting on the central nervous system is currently being advocated for by nearly 40 
states (as of November 2017), and if consensus is reached, could close off this potential avenue for the 
proliferation of NBCWs. 
4 There are many neuro-microbial agents outside the scope of this article on behavioral influence that also target 
the central nervous system. For a comprehensive review, see Giordano 2014: 103-7.  
5 Small neuromodulators, notably Oxytocin and Testosterone, can reach the brain through nasopharyngeal 
passages, but the vast majority of potential NBCW agents do not have this capability and must be inhaled and 
transferred to blood through respiratory tissue. See Crockett and Fehr (2014). 
6 Most relevantly: the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the 1966 International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, and the 1987 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment. 
7 Most relevantly: the 1925 Geneva Protocol, the 1972 Biological Weapons Convention, and the 1993 Chemical 
Weapons Convention. 
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